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Abstract
Conversational rules of everyday communication are applied to the interaction between 
experimenters and subjects. According to these rules, contributions to a communication should 
be informative, relevant, true, and unambiguous. It is assumed that subjects determine the 
pragmatic meaning of instructions and questions on the basis of these rules and the provided 
context. In contrast to most natural settings, standardized experimental procedures rarely allow 
for an interactive determination of pragmatic meaning and often preclude feedback as a 
corrective device. As a consequence, subjects are required to rely heavily on general rules, and 
even subtle cues may become informationally loaded. The information extracted from context 
cues may often not be intended by the experimenter. Thus subjects may infer more than they 
are supposed to, resulting in discrepancies between the experimenter’s intended and subjects’ 
inferred meaning of the instructions. If researchers are not sensitive to the information provided 
by verbal and non-verbal context cues, their interpretation of research results may be based on 
biased data. Evidence from different research domains is reported to support the presented 
assumptions and their implications for bias avoiding strategies are discussed.
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The Informative Function of Research Procedures:
Bias and the Logic of Conversation
As experimental psychologists we learn to be aware that certain aspects of our research 
methods may reduce the validity of our results. Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, and Gonzales 
(1990) distinguish two types of artifacts, namely bias due to unintended influences of the 
experimenter (Rosenthal, 1966, 1969) and bias due to subjects* reactions towards demand 
characteristics (McDavid, 1965; Ome, 1962, 1969; Weber & Cook, 1972). In his seminal 
discussion of demand characteristics, Ome (1962) assumed that subjects are motivated to look 
for cues in the experimental situation that provide them with the experimenter’s hypothesis. In 
order to play the role of a "good subject”1, participants in experiments may then respond 
according to the suspected hypothesis.
Ome’s analysis initiated a considerable amount of research on the validity of 
experimental findings, the roles of subjects in the experiment, and related topics (e.g. Adair & 
Schachter, 1972; Carlston & Cohen, 1980; McDavid 1965; Weber & Cook, 1972; for an 
overview see Kruglanski, 1975). However, the discussion focussed on subjects’ motivation to 
detect and to act according to the experimenter’s hypothesis, and on the resulting threatened 
validity, rather than on the process of how subjects infer the experimenter’s hypothesis on the 
basis of the experimental situation. In a cognitive inteipretation of demand effects, Wyer (1974) 
suggested that subjects may use the information provided by experimental cues in the same way 
as any other information. Although this assumption helps us understand how the provided 
information is used, it does not solve the more basic problem of how exactly this information 
is extracted from the instructions and the experimental setting.
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Experimental Artificiality versus Natural Situations
Subjects’ knowledge of being in a scientific experiment is a key element in Ome’s analysis 
(Ome, 1962, 1969). By agreeing to participate, subjects accept a "special form of social 
interaction" (Ome, 1962, p. 777) between themselves and the experimenter. It is argued that 
this special form of interaction creates an experimental artificiality that consists of several 
components. First, subjects "implicitly agree to perform a wide range of actions or requests 
without inquiring as to their purpose" (Ome, 1962, p. 777). In addition, subjects’ response 
alternatives are often very restricted. Finally, it is argued that due to the reduced implications 
of the experimental outcome, subjects are less motivated than in natural settings. From this 
perspective, an experimental situation elicits systematically different responses than would the 
same situation in a natural context. Often, such differences may be driven by subjects’ 
motivation to act as "good subjects".
In contrast to Ome’s emphasis on the uniqueness of the experimenter - subject 
interaction, we argue that subjects may apply the same rules that guide social discourse in 
natural settings to experimental situations. However, the application of these rules is often not 
appropriate due to the uniqueness and constraints of the experimental setting (Hilton, 1990, 
1991). Although the resulting effects may in part be similar, we suggest a different underlying 
mechanism, that does not rely on the assumption that subjects are motivated to enact the role 
of a "good subject". As our arguments build on conversational rules in natural settings, we 
shall first introduce these rules, before we relate them to the experimental situation.
Conversational Rules in Natural Situations: The Co-Operative Principle
According to conceptualizations of everyday communication (Grice, 1975; Clark, 1985), 
communication proceeds according to a "co-operative" principle, and the success of
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communication depends on the degree to which the participants co-operate. The co-operative 
principle is specified by four maxims (see Table 1).
Table 1 about here
First, a maxim of quantity demands that contributions are as informative as required, but not 
more informative than required. Second, a maxim of quality requires participants to provide no 
information they believe is false or lack adequate evidence for. Third, according to a maxim of 
relation, contributions need to be relevant for the aims of the ongoing interaction. Finally, a 
maxim of manner states that contributions should be clear, rather than obscure or ambiguous.
The Co-Operative Principle in Experimental Settings
Let us now apply these maxims, which guide communicators in producing and 
interpreting utterances in everyday life, to the experimental situation. The experimenter first 
asks subjects for help in the research process and exposes them to a situation with which they 
are by and large unfamiliar. To determine what they are supposed to do in this novel situation, 
they need to rely on the experimenter’s instructions. The experimenter, however, is likely to 
provide either too much, too little, false, irrelevant, or ambiguous information, thus violating 
the expectation of co-operative conduct that the subjects bring to the lab. Nevertheless, until 
debriefing, the experimental situation requires subjects to believe the given information to be 
relevant, true, and sufficient for their task, and subjects are unlikely to perceive a violation of 
conversational norms.
From the subject’s perspective it is not enough to understand the experimenter’s 
contributions semantically, that is to comprehend the literal meaning of a word or a sentence.
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Rather, the subject must also determine the meaning that is intended by the experimenter. To 
infer this pragmatic meaning of an utterance (Clark, 1985), subjects are required to go beyond 
the information given. In obeying the co-operative maxims, subjects will assume that (all) the 
information provided to them is relevant, and that neither too much, nor too little information 
is given for their task. Moreover, subjects are likely to presuppose that any part of the 
experiment is relevant to the previous parts, unless explicitly informed otherwise.
Note, however, that the information provided to subjects is not restricted to the 
experimenter’s utterances. Rather, subjects may use apparently formal features of the 
questionnaire or the experimental setting as additional sources of information in determining the 
pragmatic meaning of their task, as we shall show in some detail below. Accordingly, our 
application of the Gricean maxims to the experimental setting extends their usual application 
from the interpretation of verbal utterances to the broader issue of determining the pragmatic 
meaning of a task. Although this "liberalised" application of Gricean maxims may seem 
controversial to linguists, the findings reviewed below will testify to its explanatory power.
The Impact of Experimental Standardization
It has been pointed out that a correct identification of the intended meaning is most 
likely when the social situation is largely unrestricted, and when the situation allows for a 
feedback loop between the speaker’s intention and the listener’s interpretation (Clark & 
Schober, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964; Kraut, Lewis, & 
Swezey, 1982). Subsequent contributions can then be adapted to the requirements of the 
communication process.
In contrast, the communicative situation of an experiment is usually severely 
constrained. Instructions, questions, and response alternatives are often provided in a
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standardized format for all subjects. Subjects are not provided with the option to ask the 
experimenter for more, clearer and more relevant information -- and if they do, they most 
likely will not receive it. Thus, the experimental situation can be regarded as a "standardized 
question situation" (cf., Strack, in press, a; Strack & Schwarz, in press).
The standardization of the experimental procedure allows researchers to reduce the 
variation within experimental conditions and unintended effects due to the experimenter 
(Aronson et al, 1990; Rosenthal, 1966, 1969). However, by eliminating the possibility of 
feedback, the standardization also forces subjects to interpret the intended meaning by relying 
more heavily on the context of the provided information than they usually would in natural 
situations. Due to the increased difficulty of determining the pragmatic meaning, subjects may 
interpret even subtle context cues, verbal and otherwise, to be informationally "loaded".
Bias as a Result of Going Beyond the Information Given
As a result, many situational cues may potentially become relevant when subjects are 
determining the pragmatic meaning of their task. Whether intended or not subjects may infer 
more than they are supposed to and the (additional) information provided by the cues may lead 
to a psychological meaning of the treatment that is not intended by the experimenter. However, 
an alteration of the psychological meaning of the treatment may be viewed as equivalent to an 
experimental artifact (Kruglanski, 1975, p. 116). Note that misunderstandings between 
experimenter and subject are unlikely to be detected, again due to the standardization of the 
experimental situation.
If the context cues change the inferred nature of the task, subjects’ responses will 
systematically differ and the results will be biased: The observed effects are not solely due to 
the intended manipulation, but also to subjects’ inferences based on the context cues. The
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direction of bias resulting from these mechanisms is determined by how subjects’ interpretations 
of the experimental setting differ from the experimenter’s intention -- 
and not by subjects’ motivation to comply with the experimenter’s hypothesis. If the meaning 
that subjects infer works towards the experimenter’s hypothesis, the effect will parallel the 
pattern of a demand effect.2 However, the meaning that subjects infer may also work against 
the experimenter’s hypothesis.
In contrast to Ome’s argument, the suggested perspective does not require specific 
motivational assumptions that go beyond the general motivation to make sense of the 
experimenter’s contributions. We assume that discrepancies between the experimenter’s 
intended and the subjects’ inferred meaning may often account for bias in experimental settings, 
and that motivations that are supposed to be specific for the experimental situation (such as 
"being a good subject") are often not necessary. As subjects rely heavily on the co-operative 
maxims in determining the nature of their task they might be described as "co-operative". This 
meaning of "co-operative" is, however, very different from the meaning used to describe 
"good" subjects who are especially vulnerable to demand effects (Sigall, Aronson, & Van 
Hoose, 1970). Note, that we do not want to deny a motivation to comply with the suspected 
hypothesis. Rather, we want to suggest another source of potential bias. In fact, before subjects 
could possibly respond in line with a "good subject" role, they need to infer the experimental 
hypothesis from the context cues. We argue that the presented perspective may provide us with 
a better understanding of this process.
We now turn to a selective review of experimental evidence that supports the 
perspective offered here. We intentionally omit studies bearing on the impact of conversational 
norms on attribution processes, as these have been discussed in detail by Hilton (1990, 1991). 
In presenting the evidence, we take the subject’s perspective and distinguish between different
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requirements during the course of the experiment. In the experiment, subjects have to find out, 
first, the pragmatic meaning of the task, second, which information they are supposed to use, 
and third, which information they are supposed to provide. Let us now consider each of these 
steps in detail.
Determining the Meaning of the Task
Before responding to an experimental task, subjects will try to determine what is intended by 
the given instructions. According to the above considerations, they may rely on subtle context 
cues and may draw inferences by using the co-operative maxims. We suggest that the 
immediate context, consisting of the experimenter’s contributions before or after a question or 
instruction, is especially likely to provide these cues. For example, if several questions are 
asked, the direct context of a question could consist of the preceding question on the one hand, 
and the provided response alternatives on the other hand.
Preceding Questions as Sources of Information
In psychological experiments as well as in opinion polls, participants are often required 
to answer questions that may be phrased ambiguously, making it even more difficult to 
determine what is meant than is typically the case in language processing. Research in the 
domain of survey methodology demonstrated that respondents do not only readily answer such 
questions, but report attitudes and opinions even towards non-existent, fictitious issues 
(Schuman & Presser, 1981). In doing so, it seems unlikely, however, that subjects will simply 
"flip a mental coin", as was assumed by Converse (1970) and many researchers in the survey 
tradition. Rather, relying on the co-operative principle, subjects are likely to assume that the 
presented questions make sense and are asked in a meaningful order — and that the
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experimenter expects that subjects are able to answer them. As subjects expect a meaningful 
question, and do not have the option to ask the experimenter for clarification, they will try to 
determine the exact meaning of the question by other means. Thus, questions on fictitious 
issues are likely to be transformed into a better defined issue, that makes sense in the context 
in which the question is presented. As adjacent questions normally refer to each other, it is 
very likely that subjects try to use the content of the preceding question to disambiguate the 
meaning of an ambiguous subsequent one.
A study by Strack, Schwarz, & Wanke (1991, Experiment 1) supports these 
considerations. In this study, German college students were asked about their attitude towards 
an alleged "educational contribution”. For half of the sample, this target question was preceded 
by a question about the average tuition fees that students have to pay at US universities. The 
other half of the sample had to estimate the amount of money that the Swedish government 
pays every student as a contribution to his or her living. As expected, students’ attitude towards 
an "educational contribution” was more favorable when the context referred to money students 
received from the government (M = 4.7 on an 8-point rating scale) than when it referred to 
tuition fees (M = 2.8). These results, and additional analyses of subjects’ interpretations of the 
question, indicated that respondents interpreted the meaning of the fictitious issue on the basis 
of the preceding question.
Two different aspects render the content of preceding questions especially likely to serve 
as a context cue for determining the pragmatic meaning of a subsequent question. First, the 
order of questions often constitutes a conversational context per se, because adjacent questions 
in a social discourse should relate to each other (Grice, 1975). Second, the content of preceding 
questions is highly accessible for subjects, because the information was recently activated 
(Higgins & King, 1981). According to these considerations, responses to ambiguous questions
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may be biased toward an interpretation based on the preceding question. If a systematic effect 
of the preceding question on the interpretation of a target question is not intended, special 
attention should therefore be given to the potential implications of the preceding question(s). In 
order to avoid unintended effects, it may not be enough to pretest the meaning of isolated parts 
of the experiment, e.g. the question assessing the most important dependent variable. As the 
presented findings suggest, the meaning of an instruction or question can change depending on 
the context in which it is presented. Although probably more effortful, it seems useful to pretest 
instructions and questions in the experimental context in which they will finally be presented.
Response Alternatives
As outlined above, subjects’ search for cues to determine their task will not be restricted 
to any specific element of the experimental setting. In addition to instructions and preceding 
questions, the response alternatives provided as part of a question may also be used to 
determine the question’s intended meaning (cf. Schwarz & Hippier, 1987, 1991; Schwarz, 
1990, for a more general discussion). Suppose, for example, that respondents are asked to 
indicate how frequently they were "really irritated" recently. Before giving an answer, the 
respondent must decide what the researcher means by "really irritated". Does this refer to 
major irritations, such as fights with one’s spouse, or does it refer to minor irritations, such as 
having to fight for service in a restaurant? Again, respondents are likely to consider the context 
of the question to determine its meaning. In order to know what the question exactly refers to, 
subjects may use the information provided by the response alternatives.
A study by Schwarz, Strack, Müller, and Chassein (1988) supports this assumption. 
Respondents who were asked to report how often they were "really irritated" on a scale ranging 
from "several times a day" to "less than once a week" considered instances of less severe
irritations to be the target of the question than respondents who were presented a scale ranging 
from "several times a year" to "less than once every three months". Specifically, the former 
reported "typical examples" of their irritating experiences that were rated as significantly less 
severe than the latter. Thus, subjects used their general knowledge about the frequency of mild 
and severe irritations in combination with the response alternatives provided to them, to 
determine the (presumably) intended meaning of the ambiguous term "really irritated". As a 
result, the two identically worded questions assessed frequency reports of substantively different 
behaviors, depending on the frequency range of the response alternatives that were provided.
In general, subjects assume that the response alternatives presented to them are 
meaningfully related to the nature of their task (cf. Schwarz & Hippier, in press) — or why else 
would the researcher provide them in the first place? Based on this assumption, they extract 
information from the response alternatives to determine the exact meaning of the question asked 
(for response alternatives affecting conjunction errors see also Dulany & Hilton, 1991; Politzer 
& Noveck, 1991). This informational function of response alternatives implies, however, that 
they can also be a source of systematic bias (cf. Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Hippier, 1991, for 
reviews).
Whereas the preceding study focused on response alternatives presented as part of a 
question, similar considerations apply to behavioral response alternatives. Again, the 
experimenter’s contributions about the purpose of the study may be interpreted in the context 
of the behavioral alternatives provided to subjects. For example, subjects in Ome’s (1962) 
study were asked to do a page of simple computations, then tear up the answer sheet in pieces, 
and continue to the next page. He found that subjects continued to do so for several hours with 
only few errors. The only response alternative to adding up the numbers would have been to 
leave the experiment. As adding up numbers and then tearing the answer sheet apart is not a
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meaningful task per se, subjects needed to infer another meaning for this task. Subjects could 
construct a meaning by using the fact that they had only one response alternative - except for 
leaving the experiment. Ome, who was originally interested in finding a task subjects refused 
to perform, assumed that subjects inferred that the task was designed to test their persistence 
(Ome, 1962). Suppose subjects in Ome’s experiment would have been informed that the 
experiment was dealing with the evaluation of different tasks and that when they had enough 
experience with the presented computation task they had the opportunity to evaluate other tasks. 
Most likely, the additional response alternative would have dramatically changed Ome’s 
findings regarding his subjects’ "persistence”.
As a consequence of the reviewed findings, experimenters should examine whether the 
response alternatives are meaningfully related to the ostensible task. If this is not the case, 
interpretations of the results should be considered in the light of the additional information 
provided by the response alternatives.
Determining Which Information Should be Used
Once subjects have determined the intended meaning of the instructions, they will search for 
information to complete the task. Often, however, subjects are provided with various kinds of 
information. Thus, they have to decide whether a specific piece of information is task-relevant 
or not. Again, we assume that subjects apply the maxims of the co-operative principle.
As the most fundamental requirement of the co-operative principle is to be informative, 
subjects should not expect to receive irrelevant information (Grice, 1975). Thus, unless clearly 
indicated otherwise, they will perceive ill  the information given as potentially relevant and will 
attempt to relate it to their task. The experimenter needs to account for this process in the 
interpretation of subjects’ responses.
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Information not meant to be relevant for the experimental task may be used by the 
subject in at least two ways. First, it can be used directly for the solution of the experimental 
task by integrating it into a response decision. For example, if asked to rate the competence of 
a target person, subjects might use information not meant to be relevant. Thus, they may 
integrate a target’s group membership in their judgment, because the experimenter did provide 
this information and they assume it therefore as relevant, although they would not have done 
so in a more natural situation. Second, irrelevant information can affect subjects’ responses 
indirectly by serving as a context for determining the pragmatic meaning of the instructions. 
For example, in a study on persuasion processes, recipients’ attitudes were differentially 
affected by strong vs. weak arguments depending on the cover story used to justify exposure 
to the persuasive message (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990). Although both cover 
stories had no direct implications for the attitude judgment, the quality of the arguments had 
more impact when subjects were told that the study addressed "different aspects of information 
evaluation" rather than "different aspects of language comprehension".
That subjects may rely heavily on information provided by the experimenter simply 
because it is provided, although it may seem irrelevant on substantive grounds, is not unknown 
to social psychologists. Zukier (1982) provided subjects with information about a target’s 
studying time and asked them to predict the target’s grade point average. He found that adding 
worthless information (e.g. how many siblings the target had) reduced the impact of the more 
useful study time information on subjects’ predictions (see also Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 
1981) - presumably because by relying on the maxim of relevance subjects interpreted the 
"worthless" information to be relevant.
Similar findings emerged in studies on the base-rate fallacy (e. g., Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973). These studies consistently found that individuating information exerted more
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impact on subjects’ probability judgments than base-rate information. For example, subjects 
were asked to estimate the likelihood that a target person, randomly drawn from a sample of 
engineers and lawyers, is a lwayer or an engineer. They received a description of the target 
person that presented features representative of engineers, and were provided with information 
about the distribution of lawyers and engineers in the sample. Reflecting a pronounced impact 
of the individuating information, subjects found it more likely that the target was an engineer 
rather than a lawyer, independent of the base-rate probability. Thus, subjects used the less 
relevant individuating descriptions at the expense of the normatively more relevant base-rate 
information.
Examining the original instructions, Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, and Naderer (1991) 
suspected that this effect could partly be due to subjects* reliance on the experimenter’s 
compliance with the co-operative principle. The instructions stated that thumbnail descriptions 
had been written on the basis of personality tests administered by psychologists. Along with the 
base-rates, subjects were told that experts were highly accurate in assigning the probability 
judgments. Because psychologists can be assumed to be experts on issues of personality rather 
than on base-rates, this description grants a high degree of relevance to the individuating 
information. By stating that these experts were highly accurate in their judgments, the relevance 
of the individuating information is further increased, as the experimental task was to determine 
subjective probabilities matching those of the experts.3 In summary, in the light of the co­
operative principle, the instructions and procedures rendered the individuating information 
highly relevant.
To test these assumptions, Schwarz et al. (1991) conducted a modified replication of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) study. Subjects estimated the probability that a target person 
was either an engineer (base-rate 30%) or an lawyer (base-rate 70%). The task was either
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presented in a psychology framework (replicating the original instructions) or in a statistics 
framework. In the latter, the presumed experts were statisticians who were able to solve the 
task accurately. In addition, the applicability of the co-operative principle was manipulated by 
informing subjects that the person descriptions were either written by a human communicator, 
namely a psychologist, or that the descriptions were compiled by a computer randomly drawing 
several pieces of information from a file pertaining to the target person.
The results demonstrated that subjects were more likely to rely on the less relevant 
individuating information, the more the context suggested that it was relevant. Thus, they 
weighed the less relevant personality information more when they were told that psychologists 
were good at solving the task than when they were told that statisticians did well. And subjects 
relied on personality information more when it was presented as a thumbnail personality 
description by a human expert — whose communications they could believe to be informative 
and relevant -- than when it was presented as randomly drawn by a computer.4 These weighing 
decisions seem perfectly reasonable, if the information provided were relevant. However, the 
experimenter intentionally constructed an uninformative message in a context that suggested 
otherwise, thus violating the co-operative principle on which subjects relied in their 
interpretation of the task.
These findings suggest that the perceived relevance of information for a specific 
experimental task is only partly determined by the requirements of the task itself (for other 
effects of conversational norms on the use of base-rate information see Krosnick, Li, & 
Lehman, 1990). Rather, any information provided by the experimenter seems relevant, simply 
by virtue of being provided, in line with the maxim of relevance. This can result either in a 
direct use of this information for the solution of the task, or in indirect use to determine the 
nature of the task. Thus, any given information can be considered relevant and can be used, if
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its relevance is not discredited in other ways. The effects of task irrelevant information are 
expected to be accentuated whenever the nature of the experimental task is ambiguous and 
instructions are vague. In this case, the presumably "irrelevant information" is likely to be used 
to determine the nature of the task.
As the maxim of relevance implies, "irrelevant” information provided by filler tasks or 
cover stories cannot by default be considered as unrelated to the experimental task in focus. 
The presented findings support the assumption that subjects are likely to use any information 
given. Often, however, it is inevitable to provide subjects with cover stories or filler tasks, and 
therefore to include information that the experimenter considers as irrelevant to certain parts of 
the experiment. Consequently, if irrelevant information is provided, it seems necessary to 
explore how this information could potentially be used for the task and how it might change the 
perceived purpose of the task.
Determining Which Information Should be Provided
When asked to provide information to the experimenter, subjects will have to consider which 
information the experimenter wants to have. Again, subjects can rely on the co-operative 
principle to determine which information to provide. According to this principle, participants 
in an interaction do not only assume their partner to be co-operative, but should be co-operative 
themselves as well. The maxim of quantity requires the recipient of a question to provide only 
information that is not already known to the experimenter. Information which has already been 
given, e.g. in responding to a previous question, should therefore be considered as 
uninformative — and its repeated use would violate the maxim of quantity. Psychologists of 
language have termed this mechanism the "given-new contract". This contract follows from the 
maxim of quantity and emphasizes that contributions should provide "new information" rather
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than information that has already been "given" (Clark & Haviland, 1977; Clark, 1985). If the 
"given-new contract" is assumed to guide the interaction in an experimental situation, it will 
affect subjects' responses. In trying to be informative, subjects should not provide information 
that they have already given.
Strack, Martin, & Schwarz (1988) investigated this possibility. In their study, American 
college students were asked to report their general life satisfaction as well as their dating 
frequency. The two questions were asked in different orders. When the general life satisfaction 
was assessed prior to the frequency of dating, the correlation between both variables was low, 
I  =  -.12, n.s. Reversing the order dramatically increased the correlation t o i  = .66, reflecting 
the impact of increased cognitive accessibility (cf. Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987). Thus, 
respondents were more likely to consider their dating behavior in making judgments of life- 
satisfaction when their attention was directed to it by the preceding question than when it was 
not. In a third condition, the perceived conversational context was manipulated. The two 
question were explicitly placed in the same conversational context by a lead-in that read: "Now 
we would like to learn about two areas of life that may be important for people’s overall well­
being”. In this condition the correlation dropped from r =  .66 to r =  .15, suggesting that 
respondents did not consider their dating behavior when they evaluated their life, despite the 
fact that its accessibility was increased by the previous question. Presumably, subjects did not 
use this information in forming a judgment because they had already given it. Thus, the finding 
reflects a deliberate disuse of highly accessible information due to the given-new contract (see 
also Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991).
If subjects assume the given-new contract to be valid in experimental situations, they 
should not repeatedly provide the same information. Nevertheless, in experiments the same or 
slightly different questions are often asked several times (e.g. in experiments on attitude change
Bias and the logic of conversation 18
with a pre- and post test design, or in longer item batteries designed to tap the same underlying 
attitude). According to the co-operative principle subjects do not expect to be asked the same 
question twice, and will therefore wonder why the second question is asked. Thus, 
remembering the content of the first question can evoke two different mechanisms. First, 
subjects could assume that the second question pertains to a different issue than the first one 
and their responses will be based on this change of meaning (cf. Strack et al., 1991, for 
experimental evidence to be discussed below). Second, if subjects assume the same meaning of 
the question, e.g. because they remember the exact wording, they should infer that the 
experimenter has good reason to ask the same question twice. The most plausible reason from 
the subjects’ point of view is that the experimenter expects that the answer could have changed. 
This conclusion then provides a very strong basis for bias effects.5
In sum, the presented evidence suggests that subjects’ inferences in the experimental 
situation are heavily influenced by the co-operative principle and its maxims. Additional 
evidence for this conclusion is summarized by Hilton (1990, 1991). Whereas all language 
processing requires the kind of inferences described here, this requirement is particularly 
pronounced in standardized experiments and surveys, where the opportunity for appropriate 
feedback is highly restricted.
Although the present conceptualization differs from a motivational position (Ome, 
1962), there is some interesting overlap. Both perspectives assume that (a) subjects are active 
participants rather than passive respondents, (b) the mediating processes are not necessarily 
conscious, (c) high control of the experimenter over the situation is a potential source of bias, 
and most importantly, (d) that the context provides the basis for demand effects (Ome, 1962). 
The two perspectives differ in their understanding what "acting co-operatively" means and how 
the effects are mediated.6
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Implications for Strategies to Minimize Demand Effects 
Not surprisingly, experimental psychologists have been aware of potential bias in their research 
for a long time and have developed strategies to minimize artifacts (see Aronson et al., 1990). 
In the final section we want to relate implications of the communication perspective to some of 
the strategies used.
Asking for Subjects* Help
As one strategy to minimize demand effects it has been suggested to ask subjects for 
their help (Aronson et al., 1990; Fillenbaum, 1966; Weber & Cook, 1972). For example, 
subjects are often informed that their responses are important and that their help and 
cooperation is required for investigating major research questions. This strategy may increase 
subjects’ motivation and reduce effects of social desirability and self presentation. Quite 
intentionally, this strategy defines the relationship as one of mutual trust, in which subjects will 
not be intentionally misled. Accordingly, increasing the importance of the experiment and 
asking for subjects’ help may also increase subjects’ reliance on any information offered to 
them and may increase their effort to determine the "correct" intended meaning.
As both asking for subjects’ help as well as reducing the perceived importance of the 
experiment is problematic, discrediting the co-operative maxims could be seen as a possible 
solution (Cook, Bean, et al., 1970). Specifically, subjects could be informed that through the 
course of the experiment they might be provided with irrelevant, ambiguous, too much or too 
little information for their tasks. This "solution", however, causes other severe problems. For 
example, subjects might extensively evaluate each piece of information to determine whether 
it is relevant or not. Besides making research on cognitive processing almost impossible, such 
a strategy is likely to result not only in a reduced use of irrelevant, but also of relevant
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information.
Deception
In order to avoid demand effects, deceiving subjects is perhaps the most frequent 
technique currently used (Aronson et ah, 1990). If subjects are provided with a plausible and 
coherent cover story -- or even an ostensible hypothesis the search for determining the 
pragmatic meaning will most likely be guided by this information. Under these circumstances 
it seems easier to predict subjects’ understanding of the pragmatic meaning. Note, however, 
that subjects will still determine this meaning on the basis of the maxims of the co-operative 
principle. To reduce potential bias it seems therefore necessary to relate the pragmatic 
implications of the cover story to the real hypothesis and to consider the possible relations.
The "Two experiments paradigm"
Another common technique is to separate the experimental manipulations from the 
assessment of the dependent measures by informing subjects about an ostensible first and 
second study and by changing the experimenters. A separation may reduce the likelihood that 
subjects’ responses are determined by their motivation to verify the experimenter’s hypothesis. 
However, such a separation will not preclude that the co-operative principle affects the 
interpretation of the situation. A communication perspective would imply that questions and 
tasks may be interpreted differently depending on whether they are apparently asked by one or 
by two different experimenters.
Strack, Schwarz, and Wanke (1991, Experiment 2) investigated the effects of a one vs. 
two experiments paradigm on the interpretation of questions. Subjects’ responses to two 
questions about happiness and satisfaction with one’s life showed a higher correlation if subjects
assumed that they gave their answers to two different than to the same experimenter. The 
difference in correlation coefficients indicates that the second question was interpreted 
differently depending on whether it was asked by the same or another communicator, in line 
with the "given-new contract'' discussed above.
In addition to eliciting different interpretations of the same question, the two- 
experiments paradigm may influence subjects’ responses if subjects perceive a potential 
influence of the "first" on the ostensible "second” study. If subjects assume that their task in 
the "first" study may influence their answers in the "second" study, they may try to adjust for 
this possible influence in order to give true, accurate, and informative responses. Note that this 
does not imply that subjects perceive the "two" studies as intentionally related -- they only need 
to be aware of a potential impact. For example, if subjects assume that a certain piece of 
information comes to mind because it was brought to their attention in the apparently unrelated 
"first" experiment, they may attempt to exclude this information from the data-base for 
subsequent judgments. Such intentional exclusion processes have been shown, however, to 
affect subsequent judgments in a variety of ways (cf. Schwarz & Bless, 1992, in press, for a 
detailed discussion). Similarly, subjects may try to "correct" their responses for the perceived 
influence. In doing so subjects require a "theory" about the direction and the amount of the 
perceived impact (Jacoby & Kelley, 1987). As it is unlikely that subjects do have access to this 
type of knowledge (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), the perceived impact for which they correct will 
probably be over- or underestimated (Strack, in press, b).
Evidence for these considerations has been provided by Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler, 
and Wanke (in press). In a "first" study subjects were subtly primed with trait categories with 
either positive or negative implications for a judgment task in an ostensible "second" study. In 
addition, half of the subjects’ attention was directed towards the source of the influence.
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Subjects who were not reminded of the priming episode rated the target more positively when 
the primes had a positive than a negative valence, replicating findings of previous studies (e.g., 
Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). If, however, subjects were 
reminded of the priming event, a positive prime resulted in more negative ratings than a 
negative prime. The findings suggest that as long as subjects were not aware of a potential 
influence the primed information was used in forming a representation of the target ~  resulting 
in an assimilation effect. If, however, subjects were reminded of priming episode the primed 
information was not used in forming a representation of the target, but served as a standard of 
comparison — resulting in a contrast effect. This suggests that subjects may deliberately 
disregard highly accessible information, presumably in order to avoid a potential influence and 
to give accurate, unbiased answers. In sum, these findings suggest that effects due to the co­
operative principle cannot simply be eliminated by the "two-experiments paradigm".
Pre- and Post-Tests to Explore the Perceived Purpose of Procedures
Experimenters do not only rely on strategies designed to avoid demand effects but also 
try to control for these effects by probing into subjects* hypothesis after they took part in the 
experiment (cf. Carlopio, Adair, Lindsay, & Spinner, 1983). This technique, however, seems 
only useful if subjects are aware of the experimenter’s hypothesis. As outlined above, a change 
of the psychological meaning of the treatment mediated by conversational rules is not 
necessarily related to an explicit assumption about the hypothesis. Therefore, asking subjects 
for their beliefs about the hypothesis is unlikely to discover these kinds of bias. Instead, or in 
addition, it seems very useful to pretest instructions and questions to discover whether the 
intended meaning equals the inferred meaning. Experimenters could expose some subjects to 
the whole actual experiment — and not only to the critical sequences ~  to ensure that pretest
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subjects are provided with the whole context. Then, all context cues are potentially available 
when subjects determine the pragmatic meaning of the instructions or questions. Depending on 
the duration of the experiment, it seems useful to stop the experiment several times to ask 
subjects what they think is meant by the instructions and questions. This procedure, which is 
becoming increasingly common in pretesting survey questions (cf. Belson, 1981), would detect 
discrepancies between the experimenter’s and the subjects’ understanding of what is meant in 
the very situation. In addition, in the long run, experimenters would become more sensitive to 
how subjects infer the intended meaning.
Instead of a pretest experimenters could ask subjects after the experiment, what they 
thought was meant by the instructions and questions. However, as the intended meaning of 
instructions and questions could change while the experiment is proceeding, a "post-test" has 
the disadvantage of relying on subjects’ memory of the crucial situation.
In summary, the perspective offered here focuses on potential bias due to discrepancies 
between the experimenter’s intended and the subjects’ inferred meaning of the treatment. We 
argue that the described effects cannot be eliminated in ways that are used to eliminate bias due 
to subjects’ motivation to comply with the suspected hypothesis. It therefore seems desirable for 
experimenters to develop a sensitivity how even subtle cues can lead to a misunderstanding 
between them and their subjects. Knowing how subjects apply their knowledge about 
conversational norms in everyday communication to the experimental setting could contribute 
to this development.
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Footnote
1. The role of a good subjects may consist in contributing to the process of research 
(Ome, 1962, 1969) or to make a good impression by responding as would a healthy, 
intelligent, normal subject (Rieken, 1962). Often, but not always (Sigall, Aronson & Van 
Hoose, 1970), the two aspects will have the similar implications for subjects’ responses, i.e. 
to comply with the experimenter’s hypothesis.
2. By a similar mechanism, the experimenter’s contributions might implicitly inform the 
subjects about the actual hypothesis. This hypothesis may then provide a basis for subjects’ 
tendency to comply with the experimenter’s hypothesis (Ome, 1962).
3. Additionally, the relevance of the individuating information is increased by holding 
the base-rate constant and varying the individuating information for five different targets. 
Thus, judgments grounded only on the base-rate would result in the same solution for all 
five tasks.
4. The present data indicate that subjects’ apparent overreliance on individuating 
information and neglect the base-rate information is to a considerable degree due to the 
impact of the co-operative principle. While this finding should serve to moderate complaints 
about individuals’ insensitivity to base-rates, in does not invalidate the research on the 
representativeness heuristic. However, the degree to which they rely on this information has 
been exaggerated in some classic experiments due to the discussed mechanisms.
5. Note, that remembering the answer is not essential for both mechanisms.
6. It seems interesting to note that the two perspectives imply different effects of 
subjects’ sophistication with psychological experiments. According to a communication 
perspective, prior experience with experiments, especially experiments involving deception, 
should reduce subjects’ reliance on the rules of communication. As a consequence, subjects 
are less likely to base their search for context cues and their inferences on the maxims of the 
cooperative principle. Thus, bias effects mediated by applying the rules of communication 
should decrease with the increase of experimental experience. From a motivational 
perspective it is plausible to assume that subjects’ ability to detect the correct hypothesis 
should increase with experimental experience. Therefore, demand effects should be more 
pronounced for subjects’ with prior experience with psychological experiments. As the 
predictions of the communication perspective has not been tested, and as the evidence for the 
prediction implied by the motivational perspective is rather mixed (for an overview see 
Kruglanski (1975), an empirical evaluation of this question is yet not possible.
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Table 1. The Maxims of the Co-operative Principle 
Maxim of Quantity
Make your contributions as informative as required, but not more informative than is 
required.
Maxim of Quality
Try to make your contribution one that is true. That is, do not say anything you believe 
to be false or lack adequate evidence for.
Maxim of Relation
Make your contribution relevant to the aims of the ongoing conversation.
Maxim of Manner
Be clear. Try to avoid obscurity, ambiguity, wordiness, and disorderliness in your use 
of language.
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